

Sociologizing Organized Deviancy*

Lau-Fong MAK**

**The author is currently an professor in the Department of Sociology at the Tamkang University.

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
Abstract

Individual deviancy in Criminology is a multi-disciplinary study, and traditionally a number of disciplines notably Sociology, Psychology, Economics, Law and Biology offer theories to explain crime and criminals. *Organized* deviancy show more Sociological potency judging by its sophistication in resources management, mobilization of manpower and organizational rationality. A few dimensions of organized deviancy are presented to demonstrate its affinity with Sociology, and these include solidarity patterns, authority structure, and adaptive change. Classical concepts related to these selected dimensions are used only as an organizing tool, and hence no appraisals of these leading concepts are attempted.

The underworld is heterogeneous for it is composed of diverse units such as conventional secret societies, criminal collective, terrorist groups and intelligence agencies. Not all of them are organized on the same solidarity base, some of them on mechanical and others organic solidarity; and some others fall in between the two ends.

Each variety of solidarity is discussed in conjunction with the Weberian pattern of authority, namely traditional, legal-rational and charismatic. We find that authority structure also explains the stability of deviant collective, especially in leadership succession.

Social change also takes place in the underworld, which is an even more complicated process, for organized deviancy is, as understood by Simmel, only a Secondary phenomenon. Deviant collectives need to adapt not only to changes in the manifest society or the Primary phenomenon, but also to that in the underworld. As a response to social change in the manifest society, certain deviant collectives have gone international resulting in the rearrangement of their power structure to maximize profits in the Capitalist economy. Opening up new niche for technological related businesses is yet another response.



It concludes that the repertoire of findings on deviant collective is ready for sociologizing or sociological theorizing.

Key Words: Deviant collective, solidarity patterns, authority structure, social change, internationalism, the Triad, Cosa Nostra, Mafia and Boryokudan.



Introduction

Individual deviancy is analytically different from organized deviancy in a number of ways, and particularly in the complexity of deviant acts, type of victims and legal implications. Traditionally, individual deviancy which comprises relatively simple acts, has been explained by biological and hereditary defects, psychological abnormality, transmission of lower class value, or labeling effects. When deviant acts are seen as the product of group pressure from transient collective, the most often quoted explanations are delinquent subculture, subculture of delinquency and subculture of violence (e.g. Cohen 1955; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Matza 1964; Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967). Organized deviancy which comprises secret societies, organized crime, terrorism and intelligence agencies, can seldom be explained adequately by paradigms constructed for individual deviancy and gang behavior. In this regard, Sociological theories on group formation, group process and group activity are more readily applicable to deviant collective than to individual deviants, because of its relative permanency (Cressey 1972).


A delinquent sub-cultural group might have an objective, but its members would one day outgrow it with advance in age. Deviant collective, however, normally outlives its members, even after the originally avowed goals have been achieved. For instance, the China Triad changed its cause from a revolutionary one to become a protection agency after the collapse of the Manchu government. The

continual survival of deviant collective after severe external impact underlines the sophistication of the collective's structural rationality and internal cohesiveness.

With justifiable reasons, few academics in general and sociologists in particular, show interest in organized deviancy. The lack of interest is partly responsible for the laxity in social science methodology in the field of study. Simmel (1950) must be credited to be the first sociologist who initiated a systematic study on secret societies. Beginning with personal secrecy as primordial in presenting oneself, he analyzed the process of de-individualization through which personal secrecy is traded in for group secrecy. Besides, after examining a repertoire of European and African secret societies that were active before the twentieth century, including also criminal collective, Simmel (1950: 361-378) outlined eleven features of these secret societies¹. Some of the characteristics are commonly shared with the open collective, but all of them are present in these secret societies, a finding which requires elaboration in light of the growing volume of literature.

Being disadvantaged in space and time, Simmel does not have the advantage to include secret societies operating in the Orient for a cultural contrast. For instance, for the well-documented American

¹ These features include the limitation on organic growth, use of sign language to keep group secret, membership exclusion and inclusion principles, de-personalization or de-individualization, correlation between power centralization and use of violence, blank-out of competing allegiance, being subservient to the aristocracy, release of secrecy graduated by seniority, group altruism over members' egoism, equal share of damages caused by any members, and replacing central government in offering protection.




and Asian secret collectives, the limitation of organic growth, being one of the eleven features of secret societies, can be further differentiated according to solidarity types. Likewise, Simmel was also unable to accommodate the concept of social change in his analysis of those secret societies in a longitudinal manner. Although Simmel (*ibid.* p. 330) did realize the susceptibility of secret societies to social change when conceiving secret societies as a secondary phenomenon², unfortunately, he left untouched social change and response from the underworld.

Later effort that has enriched the repertoire of organized deviancy enables us to attempt to sociologize certain dimensions of organized deviancy. In this respect, criminologists, anthropologists, historians and sociologists have contributed their share. With a special emphasis on validity of documents relating to underground organizations, Roberts (1972) carefully maps out the Freemasonry's history and political contribution in perspective. The perspective restrains him from concluding that Freemasonry's involvement in the French and Russian revolutions was a concerted Masonry effort.

Studies on the Italian Mafia are certainly aplenty, fiction and non-fiction alike. Conceptualizing the Sicily Mafia as a market economy player distinguishes the work done by Gambetta (1994b). To him, Mafia means entrepreneurship, for it supplies not just goods

² The reverse flow of impact is also evident. Through mass media the value of brotherhood prevalent in the underworld has an immeasurable effect on the open society, so much so that members of the underworld are sheltered and covered up by interested parties. In a brotherhood-like manifest society, e.g., Sicily and Taiwan, the underworld rules and values would tend to reign.



and protection service, but quality service with a competitive edge over even its legitimate providers. Another distinction for his work is the meticulous use of the massive court cases.

With the extensive use of electronic bugging system, reliable information on the American La Cosa Nostra was collected. This has provided the basic data for Cressey (1969) to decode and eventually to detail out the organizational structure and the theft patterns of the then most controversial deviant collective. Excellent anthropological study on a New York Cosa Nostra brings the American public closer to the social aspect of the crime families in the nation. The author's (Ianni 1972: 181) frequent contacts with the family members at functions like family dinner, wedding and christening, enabled him to unfold the kinship structure of the deviant collective.


Tokyo's National Research Institute of Police Science has been conducting interviews with the captive Boryokudan (aka Yakuza) members since 1959. Its professional staff (e.g. Hoshino 1974) regularly study the attitude, behavior, group cohesion, hierarchical structure, value system, and even coalition and conflict among these violent groups.

Few academics would dispute the existence of secret societies in China, particularly the Triad societies and the White Lotus, for their rebellious activities had been closely watched and well documented officially for no less than two centuries. Plowing through piling heaps of local gazettes, Court dispatches and official reports furnished by law enforcement offices, Chesneaux (1972), Zhuang (1981), and Yu (1987), for example, completed their

respective socio-historical analysis of these influential deviant collectives.

While serving as a colonial official stationed in the then British Malaya and Singapore, Blythe (1969) amassed voluminous police documents on the local Chinese Secret societies since the nineteenth century. His work offers great detail on the interface between the law enforcement agencies and the local Chinese secret societies, covering the period between the 1840s and 1960s. . Despite ramifications in perspective, most academics agree that while the White Lotus was basically a rural based secret society, the Triad attracted mainly the urban migrants. A field survey using focused interviews and observation on Chinese secret society members in Malaysia and Singapore in the early 1970s unveils the symbiotic participation between the manifest and the secret societies. The symbiosis is essentially facilitated and maintained by members of the underworld who assumed a leading role in both the underworld and the legitimate society (Mak 1981: 103-104).

In short, organized deviancy is conceptually separable from individual deviancy and even sub-cultural gangs, and it is a Sociologically explainable reality in its own right. Judging by the voluminous empirical studies on secret societies worldwide, dismissing secret societies or organized crime as a myth or an artifact (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Roberts 1972) is fast becoming an over-reaction, especially in the light of rising number of legislation for regulating organized crime and secret societies (Mak 1998).



We shall sociologize organized deviancy by beaming on a few of its *sociologically* significant aspects, namely, solidarity patterns, group stability, and adaptive response to social change.³ We assume a parallel between legitimate and deviant collectives. Despite the unique features that characterize secret societies, the deviant collective is after all a secondary phenomenon (Simmel 1950: 362), suggesting that they both share fundamental group processes and social organizing principles. Given the parallel, sociological theories and paradigms constructed for the primary phenomenon should also be applicable to the secondary phenomenon. For instance, responding to external constraint and force of change, like legitimate collective, the underworld must also make adaptive change in function and structure, in order to mobilize and re-distribute resources more efficiently. As the manifest society is moving towards modernism from traditionalism, the direction of change in the underworld should be reflective of the movement in its organizational arrangements.

Solidarity Varieties in the Underworld

The underworld does not comprise units of similar interest, as is erroneously implied in any dichotomy of legitimate and underworld.

³ These few concepts are chosen from classical social theories to serve only as an organizing tool. The choice is for their relatively well-defined meaning and popularity (Nisbet 1966), irrespective of their theoretical adequacy. It is not the prime objective of the present paper to document and appraise social theories related to the chosen concepts.

A few classificatory schemes have been offered to unfold, directly or indirectly, the heterogeneous nature of the underworld (Mak 1981: 9-12). Some of the schemes are function-based, e.g. Political or Reformist (Heckethorn 1896; Hobsbawm 1959), others are interaction-based, e.g. Rebellious (Merton 1957: 131-160). Solidarity pattern as an added scheme is primarily a structure-based model and it refers to a collective's organizing principle, or how members of a collective are bonded socially.

Regardless of the deviant collective's avowed objective, be it religious, ideological, political, or economic, the collective's solidarity patterns also deserve rigorous sociological analysis. The study of social bond among legitimate collective such as the family, has been a core of sociological inquiry, for it is relevant not only to socialization but also to social control and the collective's adaptability to social change.

Each solidarity pattern provides a built-in mechanism to cope with social change. In substantive terms, kinship-based or mechanical solidarity would enable the leaders to mobilize resources more efficiently within the kin group. On the other hand, an organic solidarity lacks group identity which is instrumental in resources mobilization.


As a social institution, a family can be broken up by external factors as well as internal discord. Families based on consanguine, conjugal or adoptive relations would respond differently to external force of change. The once famous Japanese patriarchal management style that promises life-time employment aims to enhance both

organizational and job stability. The early Southeast Asian Chinese immigrants' social bonds arising from dialect, clan or subculture explain their differential interaction patterns. Within the immigrant community, resources mobilization revolved around dialect group identity, relegating provincial collective's cohesiveness to a kind of organic solidarity. A helping hand was more readily lent to someone from the same dialect group than an outsider (Mak 1995:176-186). Similarly, the ethnic minorities in the States survived not by appealing to commercial financial institutions, but by drawing heavily upon their own ethnic resources such as the traditional mode of social organization (Light 1984); and rotational credit associations are one such mode.

Like members of legitimate groups, members of organized deviancy are also bonded to one another by some kinds of ties, which are constantly reinforced through rituals and ceremonies. Because of their differences in solidarity base, it would not be surprising for the Japanese boryokudan, the Chinese secret societies in the early Malaya, and La Cosa Nostra to respond differentially to social impact.

Four broad types of solidarity can be identified out of the better documented secret societies. As the following figure shows, at one extreme there is the mechanical solidarity which is characterized by similarity in value, custom and belief. The kinship bond among the Cosa Nostra members exemplifies this variety.

At the other extreme is organic solidarity which stresses on members' specialized functions and hence interdependency, a kind



of bond usually found among business corporations. In Criminological literature, the Black Mafia in America (Ianni 1974) and intelligence agencies⁴ such as the CIA and KGB, come very close to this variety.

In between the two extremes, it is possible to locate a few varieties of solidarity models; the fictive kinship as the more salient one is a kind of constructed blood relationship.

Figure: Varieties of Solidarity Patterns

Mechanical				Organic
1	2	3a	3b	4
1. Kinship-based: Cosa Nostra/ Mafia				
2. Tribal/territorial: Ku Klux Klan / Ghee Hock				
3. Fictive kinship				
		a. Oyabun-kobun: Yamaguchi Gumi		
		b. Siblings: Freemasonry/ China Triad		
4. Corporate: Black Mafia/ Intelligence agencies				

As a bonding principle, fictive kinship consists of two sub-models of solidarity patterns: the Oyabun-kobun (role of father and role of son) and the sworn siblings (brotherhood or sorority). The

⁴ Intelligence agencies have long been classified by the Criminologists or academics as a kind of organized crime (criminal organization), despite arguably claimed otherwise by law enforcement agencies. See, for example, Chambliss (1989) and the special issue on the varieties of state and corporate crime, *Social Justice* (1989). Organized crime comprising state crime fits well the definition of secret societies (e.g. Simmel 1950: 345-346). While the nation that operates the intelligence units does not normally regard them as a criminal organization, other nations probably would. Likewise, Terrorism is also a matter of who defines it (Herman and O'Sullivan 1989).


Yamaguchi Gumi adopts the oyabun-kobun organizing principle which institutes the leaders as the godfather and adoptive uncles. In another case, the Triad Society in Chinese history is a society of men, while the White Lotus had not imposed restriction on gender, where female leadership was not uncommon.

1. The Kinship-Based Variety

The kin-based deviant collective, as in the case of the American Cosa Nostra (Cressey 1969), is normally run by the head of the most powerful household, or the patriarch, who is advised by a council of counselors (*consigliere* and *sub-capo*), comprising primarily close relatives either by blood or through marital union. They are the decision makers.

At a lower level is a small core group of executive and supervisory personnel (*caporegime*) who are children of those decision makers. At the third level of the structure is a broad base of membership consisting of fighters (*soldati*) and members recruited from among distant relatives or people of Italian descent in general. Members at the third-level also regard the patriarch as their godfather.

Those who are employed to manage the legitimate businesses of the 'family' do not really belong to the 'family'. These employees are outside the organizational structure of the crime family, as far as identity and decision making process are concerned.



2. The Tribal Variety

Some secret collectives derive their source of solidarity from a relationship network secondary to kinship ties. The network nests similar geographic origins (birth place/ village), culture (subculture), speech and/ or ethnicity (racial minority). It is a tribal or sub-culture network.

The Chinese secret societies in early Malaya, e.g. the Cantonese Ghee Hin, the Hakka Hai San, and the Hokkien dominated Ghee Hock are dialect bound, expressing common origin in locality or speech (Mak 1981). Criminal collective in Taiwan, particularly those in Taipei, are differentiated also along, albeit broader locality lines: those collectives composed of Chinese Mainlanders and those of local Taiwanese (Sheu 1990). The United Bamboo, for instance, belongs to the former, for it was founded and operated by the younger generation of those Nationalist Armed Forces officials who fled from the Mainland China after 1949. Terrorist groups that are formed for political or racial purposes such as the IRA, the PLO and the Ku Klux Klan also derive their source of solidarity from the same bio-territorial principle. Members of these deviant collectives are not related to each other by consanguineous or marital ties, but they share common custom, tradition, religion, ethnicity, and/or speech. This sub-culture compares more favorably to fictive kinship in terms of social bonding.



3. The Fictive Kinship Varieties

Oyabun-kobun and *sworn siblings* are the two principal varieties of kinship constructed through rituals. The former distinguishes itself for having a patriarchal appeal, while the latter only a lateral affinity.

The Yamaguchi Gumi: The *oyabun-kobun* relationship revolves around the Japanese conception of the family, i.e. *ikka*, which nestles individuals tied by blood or nuptials. *Oyabun-kobun* is an approximation of *ikka* (Ishino 1953), and it is not creation of the Japanese underworld. Structurally, the head of the *ikka* or *gumi* performs the role (*bun*) of the father (*oyaji*), hence the term *oyabun*. The followers are called *kobun*, because they play the role of a son. Under this system, the *kobun* is expected to submit to the supreme authority of the *oyabun*, as is in the traditional Japanese father-and-child relationship. Besides leaders and followers addressing each other as such, there are also rules and norms created to ensure the constructed family relationship to be the best approximate of the concept of *ikka*.

The group leader (*oyabun*) oversees the whole organization. Below him there are two lines of staff. The *shatei* who do not normally succeed the Head, are treated as the Head's younger 'brothers' (*ototobun*), and they serve as counselors to the Head. The Head and the *shatei* are respectively 'father' (*oyabun*) and 'uncle' (*ojibun*), to the lower level *wakato* or *wakagashira*, *hosha* and *wakashu*. Occupants of the *wakato* position are entitled to assume

headship should the occasion arise. Usually, only the most trusted one would be chosen as the heir to the headship.

The relationship among the ordinary members (*wakashu*) is known as *kyodaibun* or brotherhood, where they are all *kobun* (the role of son) relative to the leader. The *kobun*, due to differential influence and/or seniority associated with faction age, are stratified among themselves. There are the 80% (as is conventionally used to mean the eldest) as against the 20% (i.e. the youngest) brothers, followed by the 70% (very senior), the 60% (senior), and lastly the 50% brothers. The so-called 50% brothers are brothers on par (Hoshino 1974) in their share of rights and obligations. The younger brothers are addressed as *ototobun* and the senior brothers *anikibun*. Such a stratification is not merely symbolic, but also material in that the share of income and proceeds is distributed according to the ratio.

A lodge or a branch household (*bunke*) is formed when a member collects sufficient followers. With the grace of the parent *Gumi* (*honke*), the branch household is then affiliated through the Japanese traditional *honke-bunke* relationship. Not all of the household units are of equal status. The most influential and powerful ones are regarded as the First-line *gumi* which command a higher degree of respect and loyalty from the Second-line *gumi*. There are in general more than four levels of such a hierarchical order within the big 'family' (Harada *et al.* 1985).

The Triad Society: The China Triad provides a classical example of a pure *brotherhood* variety. The organizational structure of the traditional Triad society is both complex and varied (Lien

1988:187), but it is generally agreeable that the idea of sworn brotherhood is traceable to two popular folk tales which glorify brotherhood, namely, the *Water Margin* and *The Tales of Three Kingdoms*. Brotherhood is in effect the fourth order of human relations in the traditional Confucian system, after relationships governing Emperor-Court Officials, Husband-Wife, and Parent-Child. However, this truncated part of the Confucian value dovetailed very well with the *urban* bachelor migrants, for sworn brothers rather than clan members back in remote villages, had served as a better provider for their badly needed resources. Brotherhood means equal share of fortune and most importantly, misfortune as well. In members' daily social transactions, the over-all leader is addressed as the Big Brother, the second man as the Second Brother, then followed by the third as the Third Brother. The rest, including a few administrative and disciplinarian officials, treat each other as equal brother.

4. The Corporate Variety

This solidarity model is characterized by the working relationship between specialists and experts in their own professions, and the working relationship between leaders and the members arises from administrative requirements. As far as its duration is concerned, the relationship among *members* is generally project based, and ends when the project contract is completed. While the relationship between each member and the organization might continue, it is

usually also contractual. Intelligence units such as the CIA (Marchetti and Marks 1974) provide the closest approximation of this organic or corporate ideal type (Chambliss 1989). A generalized structure of intelligence agencies comprises the following positions:

1. Head of State (Ex Officio)
2. Director and administrative staff
3. Chiefs of Specialized Sections
4. Specialists/ experts/ professionals

The solidarity within this kind of organized deviancy is not only associative, but also sectionalized, in that specialists working in the same team are not structurally arranged to develop any informal relationship. This is so partly because all assigned projects are coordinated by a third party who assumes the legal-rational authority, due primarily to the exigency and secrecy of the project. Moreover, these professionals communicate with one another not by personal names but by codes and passwords, making it impossible for these specialists to develop informal ties among themselves.


As these deviant units do not normally require symbiotic participation to resolve their conflicts with the manifest society, unlike other deviant collectives, their need for a mechanical solidarity naturally approaches a theoretical zero.



Solidarity Varieties and Group Stability

Weber (1947: 56-77, 328ff.) identified three pure types of legitimate authority: the traditional, the charismatic, and the legal-rational. Traditional leaders are those who obtain their authority through ascribed status such as seniority in the social system. While charismatic leadership is characterized by the leader's self-claimed or other-perceived divine quality, legal-rational leadership is essentially an institutional appointment. In all likelihood, charismatic leadership is more prevalent among the relatively transient collectives such as the Boxer's Movement (Chesnaux 1972). The deviant collectives with charismatic leaders usually collapse after the fall of their charismatic leaders. In the event that transience becomes stabilized, the collective might mature into a rational structure, and the charismatic leadership would be routinized into a rational authority, as is in the case of the White Lotus (Yu 1987) and the China Triad (Lien 1988).


A primordial attribute of secret societies is group secrecy as well as forms of safeguarding it. If group secret is constantly exposed, a deviant collective would become unstable and eventually disintegrated. A collective's solidarity base determines the mode of information flow between members and outsiders, and each mode refers to a type of authority structure. Close ties between leaders and followers tend to minimize the risk of secrecy leakage, and social bond by blood or marriage is an ideal approximation.



Also, there is little chance for a closely knitted collective to have mistakenly recruited decoys who would intercept the flow of information. Even in the event of forced dissolution, members of the family have all the legitimate causes as well as convenience to stage a reunion in the name of humanity. Another advantage of the kinship model is that members of a family are knowledgeable of each other's movement.

Group stability is often eroded by persistent power struggle among members or leaders. In all probability, dissident members in a kin-based society would not likely betray their natural family members, less so to set up rival lodges to go against their patriarchal family.

In the oyabun-kobun system where the relationship pattern is one of fictive father-and-son, the children show great spontaneity and willingness to accept punishments for the god father's wrong doings, to the extent of going to jail on his behalf. Eiji Ijichi's (Saga 1991) self-confessed eventful life exemplifies the felt attachment within a fictive family. Eiji was an apprentice in the Yakuza of Dewaya at Asakusa in 1924 before he became the gumi's boss eleven years later. An incident took place in Eiji's very early Yakuza life turned him into a very devoted Yakuza member. A gambling den under his charge was once raided by the Police. In that incident, the Police did not succeed in making any arrest as his swift action in switching off all the lights in the den foiled the attempt. But on the next day they asked the Yakuza boss to turn in some members so as to close the



file. Eiji volunteered to turn himself in and was jailed for several months.

Eiji was released after serving the term, at 4 o'clock on a freezing Winter morning, for the Police did not wish the media and the nearby residents to see the possible welcome party of Yakuza members in front of the Prison. Indeed, on that very day a big crowd, including the boss himself, gathered outside the Prison gate to greet Eiji. Eiji wrote that he was very touched for he never expected such a grand reception (*ibid.* pp. 87-97).

A Japanese study (Mugishima et al. 1984) on 667 members of regional criminal syndicates reveals that the degree of group morale is higher among members from societies founded upon the oyabun-kobun system. It can be safely assumed that kinship-based and to a great extent, the oyabun-kobun-based societies, are highly resilient under circumstances of forced dissolution. The difference between the two types of solidarity becomes more visible insofar as succession of leadership is concerned.


Succession of leadership is universally an invariable source of internal conflict among the eligible, and sometimes also the ineligible. In kinship-based organizations, transfer of power and leadership always appears to be an unexciting pre-programmed event. Research findings show that the process of power transition among consanguineous and affinal members is less destructive, although it can be tedious, long drawn and tiring. For example, the game of power struggle among the three power networks within a New York Mafia family with a fictitious name of Lupollo,

respectively led by Joe Lupollo, Charley Lupollo and Phil Alcomo (Ianni 1972: 120-125), had gone on for quite a long while. Although "these networks of power alliances are visible within the family, ... they do not create enough static in the normal system of power flow to generate tension of dysfunction." (p.122)

In contrast, for the same matter, tension and violence erupted in a fictive kinship based deviant collective. There had been sparkles and bloodshed in leadership succession in the history of the Yamaguchi gumi. Harukichi Yamaguchi, the founder and also the First Generation leader, severed his ties with his former parent organization, the Oshinma Gumi, to set up his own Yamaguchi Gumi in 1915.

There witnessed also faction fights between heirs apparent and contestants for the group leadership⁵. When the Third-Generation leader ended his 35 years of rule after a heart attack in July, 1981, the heir apparent to the Fourth-Generation Leader, Kenichi Yamatomo, died suddenly in the following February before he could be officially installed as the group leader. A council was then formed to supervise the Gumi collectively. The leadership later went to the heir apparent who was then the top Lieutenant Hiroshi Yamamoto. The position vacated by the Lieutenant was filled by a combatant member by the name Masahisa Takenaka who also showed keen interest in the top post. The ambitious duo split eventually in 1984 with Takenaka

⁵ The information is based on the interview with the Police Officers of the *Anti-Yamaguchi Gumi Task Force* at Kobe's Hyogo District Police Headquarters in 1986, and also on materials collected therefrom.




taking over the reign of the Gumi and the deposed leader Hiroshi Yamamoto setting up a rival group known as the Ichiwa Kai.

Takenaka was officially installed as the Fourth-Generation Leader of the Yamaguchi Gumi in July, 1984, but was assassinated by Ichiwa Kai men seven months later, resulting in the transfer of his leadership to the then Chief Lieutenant Kazuo Nakanishi of Osaka. It is worthy to note that in this case, violence and brutality took place in the absence of the patriarch; it is more an event between fictive brothers than between oyabun and koban. This incident does suggest that a deviant collective with a patriarch is less subject to violent solutions of structural problems than one without.

Another major issue about leadership is its *quality*. In kin-based groups, leadership quality may suffer from a limited range of choices, because of the ascriptive nature of traditionalism. Leaders bestowed with traditional authority are chosen not so much for their ability and capability as for their seniority. Already in the Lupollo family (Ianni 1972: 120) some senior members were displeased with the boss Joe Lupollo for his conservatism in managing the family business. When aging and conservatism go in tandem, the younger generation would question the older generation's leadership quality.

The corporate model, as compared to the kinship model and its variants, assumes a solidarity base that is organic in nature. It functions just like a huge bureaucracy where obligations and duties, hierarchical personnel, recruitment, and transfer of power are well spelt out. Leadership and authority are most rational and predictable, when corruption and internal politicking are kept at bay.



Furthermore, mysticism or religious ritual almost has no role to play in the protection of secrecy; contractual binding is in its place.

Limitation to organic growth is one of the eleven features of the secret societies identified by Simmel (1950: 361). The discussion above clearly indicates that type of solidarity imposes varying degrees of restriction on the growth of deviant collectives. Among the deviant collectives, the kinship based collective is most susceptible to the limiting effects on growth, while the fictive kinship based is less, and the corporate type is least susceptible. Problems related to membership also vary according to solidarity base. Members who are recruited from a source where there is little indication of loyalty, would be subject to more rigorous screening through ritual and ceremonial performances. Such performances are almost a universal practice for the non-kin-based deviant collectives (Hobsbawm 1959). In contrast, the fictive kin-based deviant collectives are endowed with a much broader base for membership recruitment, and hence the shortage of eligible members as well as leaders is hardly a problem. Their worst risk is to have admitted undercover agents, whereas kinship based collectives are immune to.

In sum, compared to the kin-based societies, collectives resting upon sworn siblings on the whole would tend to be less stable in leadership transition. Besides, the process of power transition for brotherhood collective would also be abrupt, visible, fast and violent. In terms of protecting group secret, the brotherhood deviant collective is most vulnerable and that offsets its advantage of having a wider base for membership recruitment.



Social Change and the Underworld

Social change as an ongoing process is about changes between two time periods in already established structure and patterns of social relationship, e.g. change in demographic composition, divorce rates, and family ties. In response to social change in the legitimate society, the underworld has also gone through some kind of adaptive change. Besides, the many component units in the underworld by themselves also constitute a force of change. So, social change in the underworld is not just about its responses to changes in the legitimate society, but also to changes in the underworld itself. For the time being, it is sufficient just to highlight the impact of internationalization⁶ on deviant collectives in respect of their internal authority structure and symbiotic relationship with the manifest society.

Social change in the underworld is not uniform among the component units, nor is it universal. Responding to colonialism and political suppression, a few secret collectives initiated their very first journey on internationalization well before the turn of the twentieth century. The spread of Freemasonry from England to Europe, to America, and to many of the former European colonies took place as early as the eighteenth century (Robison 1798; Short 1989; van der Veur 1976); the China Triad was brought overseas to Chinese


⁶ Internationalization, or internationalism could well be a major step toward globalization, but its main characteristic is contact between two different entities without having to become less different.

immigrant societies in the early nineteenth century (Blythe 1969; Mak 1981); and the Italian Mafia secured a foothold in the United States in the early twentieth century (Ianni 1972; 1974).

When internationalization is seen as *business connections* or cooperation between local and overseas deviant collectives, or local deviant collective's entry into the international underworld market, the trend is continuing. Reportedly since the 1970s, the Japanese Yamaguchi Gumi and the Taiwan United Bamboo have set up legitimate companies in Taiwan as a frontage to cover up their service in organized vice (Liu and Shen 1989: 226)⁷. Towards the end of the 1970s, secret societies in both Taiwan and Hong Kong have been jointly involved in book-making and futures trading activities. In 1996, the funeral of the two assassinated leaders of the Four Seas League in Taiwan was attended by a delegation sent by Japan's Yamaguchi Gumi, and received respects in the form of wreaths and symbolic pagoda from America's Huaqing (Chinese Youth) and Yueqing (Vietnamese Youth) gangs (YZZK 1996).

In the 1970s, the Japanese Boryokudans, particularly the Yamaguchi Gumi, have teamed up with criminal collectives in Hawaii and New York for drug-trafficking, smuggling of weapons, pornography and underground casino businesses (PCOC 1984: 239, 267). Cases of cooperation between the Triad societies in Hong Kong and Chinese criminal collectives in North America, the

⁷ The reference cited is a collection of news reports on Taiwan underground activities. This and a few other references are cited here only as supplementary to the validated pieces.



Netherlands and Russia are well-documented (PCOC 1984: 435-440; Chu 1996).

The mode of collaboration between criminal collectives seems to be influenced by immigration and culture conditions, in that the relatively open immigration policy of the North America facilitates the import of foreign deviant collectives. Firstly, at present, most powerful Asian criminal societies have expanded overseas including North America, Europe, England and Australia. However, there is still no definite sign of counter-flow of the Mafia or Cosa Nostra into Asia.

Secondly, common Italian descent connects Sicilian Mafia with America's Cosa Nostra. Similarly, through common Chinese origin, the more powerful criminal collectives in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and recently China (e.g. the Big Circle) have respectively set up lodges in Chinatowns in various major cities in England, America, Australia and Europe. The teaming up between the Japanese Yamaguchi and Taiwan's United Bamboo could be attributed to the previous colonization of Taiwan by the Japanese, as communication between leaders is not as problematic as that between the Italian and Chinese underworld leaders.

The cultural attachment in the internationalization of deviant collectives is traceable from the following two events. In September 1992, the Triads in Hong Kong convened a meeting with the intention to unite all overseas Chinese secret societies in general, and to reconcile the rival factions in particular (SCMP 1992). Altogether about 1,000 delegates attended the convention. The Ghost Shadows

and its ally On Leong Tong from New York, and United Bamboo based in Taiwan were also present. Hong Kong participants included Sun Yee On and the 14K. Present were also participants from Britain, France, Canada, Germany, and the Middle East, who were members of a local Triad. It was also reported that the World League of the Hong Men (a Triad) convened its third meeting in Taipei in 1993 after its formation in Honolulu a year earlier.

Internationalization is also a *trend of investment overseas*, particularly where legal tender is the means of payment. Writing in the 1960s, Maas (1968: 292) already commented that "The current fashion in the Cosa Nostra is the movement into legitimate businesses." The principal idea behind the movement is to use legitimate businesses to launder or legitimize mob money. Laundering of money is a profession which involves experts in finance, management and law, and it is definitely global, running from the Bahamas to England and to Tokyo (Robinson 1994; PCOC 1986: 7).

Yet another important component in internationalization and social change is *identifying the needs* of the consumers worldwide. Criminal collective is likened to a business corporation (Kelly 1987) whose competitiveness lies in the constant search for new products and new markets. One new development in the underworld is the manufacturing of fake credit or charge cards (ST 1994). It is an attractive venture, for credit card is a highly desirable instrument for money laundering.



The trend of internationalization has its impact on the structural and relationship patterns of the underworld, especially on power redistribution among members and among collectives. Advanced economies require professionalism, skill and knowledge which are normally learned through training and education. As the scale of deviant collective's legitimate businesses expands, good connections with politicians of high standing and government policy makers are required. Deviant collectives in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Sicily and United States have already embarked on the adaptive change (Findlay and Howarth 1992; YZZK 1996; Gambetta 1994b; Ianni 1972), and their personnel in management, finance, law and computer technology expectedly are accorded with higher prestige, power and authority.

Deviant collectives respond not only to changes in the legitimate society, but also to changes in the underworld comprising heterogeneous units. Merger and split between units are part and parcel of underworld life. In Japan, the history of Yamaguchi is illustrative of the case of unavoidable split, but the Triads in America well describes the functional and strategic merger. One important objective for a merger is *image presentation* or management, or Goffman's (1971: 109-140) so-called front region performance.

The immediate intention of deviant collective to venture into legitimate businesses is not to make huge profit, but to launder wealth already acquired illegally. The ultimate purpose of laundering money is to elevate its leaders into the 'high society' where use of violence is frowned upon. But to acquire huge illegal income is still

the basic and that basic is maintained through the use of violence. To get out of this strait jacket the well-established deviant collective delegates jobs involving extensive application of violence to partners of a peripheral status. The alliance between On Leong Tong and Ghost Shadows, and that between Yip Seng Tong and Flying Dragons (Chin 1986), illustrate well partnership between host and peripheral units as an adaptive change. Italian Mafia's hiring of the so-called 'baby killers' (teenagers) to do the dirty jobs is just yet another example. Partnership with peripheral gangs as an adaptive change in the underworld retains deviant collective's traditional connections with lower level law enforcement officers and the rank and file in related offices.

Conclusion

Unlike juvenile sub-cultural groups, deviant collectives show definite features that invite Sociological treatment. The three outstanding features (solidarity patterns, authority structure and adaptive change) presented for analysis above, are also commonly found in bureaucratic organizations and institutions such as government agencies, business corporations, family and voluntary associations.

Deviant collective consists of different varieties. Expressed in terms of Durkheimian solidarity patterns, some are kinship based, or fictive kinship based, and others are corporate like. The structure of authority of these collectives is analyzable in the Weberian tradition.

These collectives also responded to social change, to not only that in the manifest society but also that in the Simmelian secondary phenomenon itself. Many of them made adaptive changes by internationalizing both their legitimate and illegitimate business ventures. The internationalization process is to some extent also constrained by cultural as well as immigration factors, which has its parallel in legitimate business networking where culture and value plays a part.

So far, Simmel seems to be the first Sociologist who shows any interest in deviant collective or in his preferred terms, secret societies. Examining secret societies in the 1920s when information on secret societies was so severely lacking, the scope of his perspective is understandably very much limited. There have since been voluminous empirical studies on deviant collective after Simmel. The repertoire of findings helps not only invalidate assumptions of organized crime as a myth or an artifact, but also suggests fresh approaches in the study of deviant collective. Gambetta (1994a; 1994b) and Arlacchi (1988) are the very few who launched a series of sociological theorizing and re-interpretation of deviant collective and its rationality in the *modus operandi*; concepts like 'trust', 'inscrutable market', 'industry', and 'capitalist spirit' are central to their construction of sociological paradigms. They would have offered better generality in their theorizing exercise, had they also made extensive use of deviant collective other than just the Italian Mafia.



Studies cited above suggest that the fictive kinship holds members better under the impact of social change. While sworn brotherhood was attested by the Freemasonry, oyabun-kobun fits the Yamaguchi Gumi rather well. As a social institution, the oyabun-kobun system evolved in the late feudal period around 1700, during which artisans, merchants, peddlers and some other occupational groups organized themselves into guilds led by patriarchs. The system reached its peak of popularity toward the end of nineteenth century and continued to prevail even until the American Occupation period, during which political movements and parties were also modeled after the oyabun-kobun system (Ishino 1953). Although after the Occupation the system has become less prevalent in the legitimate society, its root is still firmly entrenched in the soil of the underworld. It is indeed a time and culture bound organizing principle, with only minor modifications such as the exclusion of oyabun (the grandfather role), and a shift of focus from ojibun (the uncle role as relative to the kobun) to shatei (the younger brothers) as the oyabun would address them.

In contrast to social change, there is also *social unchanged*, as is evident from secret collectives that have been little impacted upon by internationalization. The White Lotus societies (Yu 1987), for example, had never moved southward, let alone leaving the China mainland, in spite of being active for a few centuries in Northern China. The Poro (Bellman 1984) has been active in a number of territories adjacent to Liberia, but until now it is still confined in the African Continent. Similarly, the Ku Klux Klan, whose main concern



is its internal ethnic minorities issues, has yet to spread beyond America.


In a reverse analysis, historians have been tracing the impact of secret societies in early European and Chinese societies (Chesnaux 1972; Roberts 1972; Yu 1987), however cautious their manner is. It is perhaps the time now for social theorists to ponder over the inter-relatedness between the deviant collective and the manifest society.

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有組織的偏差之社會學化

麥留芳

中文摘要

在犯罪學的領域內，個體偏差是一門跨學門的學科，鑽研此學科的學者，傳統上來自社會學、心理學、經濟學、法律學、生物學家等。意外的亦可說是不幸的，連組織性犯罪集團亦同時變成了一門邊際學科，在社會學裡一直也受到莫須有的排斥。在廣義的界定下，組織性的偏差涵蓋了地下組織（如恐怖份子組織、秘密結社）、犯罪組織、非法暴力集團等。其實，從犯罪組織的某些特質去審視，社會學的理论似更能詮釋有組織性的偏差，尤其是犯罪組織的現象，其實質及其變異。這些特質包括物質資源的統籌，人力資源的運用，以及組織結構的理性化程度。

本文希望透過某些犯罪組織的現象，如社會紐帶的型式，權力結構及適應性變遷等，以表出社會學與組織性偏差這學科的親和性。此處僅把上述的社會學古典概念當作導向工具，以表述該二學科的親和性，將不對該些概念的理論性意涵或適切性加以評論。

齊末爾（Simmel）把有組織的偏差視為社會副現象。它可能沒有一般社會現象那麼複雜，但它並不單純。若把這副現象視作另一（或非法）社會體系，則在此另一體系內共存的結合體似具有不同的組成基礎或社會紐帶基礎。若以涂爾幹的紐帶類型去區分，其中有屬於機械紐帶型的（如地下情報組報），有機紐帶型的（如黑手黨），或居於此兩極中的類型的（如天地會、山口組）。

要是從韋伯簡化的三源權力去分析這些偏差結合體，則可發現有些組合體的領袖和權力屬於神力型，另些則屬於傳統型或理性型的。尤有進者，這些不同權力類型的結合體卻也呈現出不同程度的穩定性，尤其是在權力交移時所產生的衝突。分析的發現是黑手黨因於採用親屬紐帶及傳統權力的組織原理，顯得特別穩定；山口組的擬制親屬次之。

社會變遷的概念不但適用於研究非法結合體，卻更能凸顯它在適應上的難度。這些結合體既身為副現象，必須要調節社會正現象在其變遷過程中所帶來的衝擊。除此之外，為了生存的優勢，各結合體之間亦必須彼此因應。為適應社會變遷好些結合體走上了國際化及現代化之路。亦因此，既有的內部權力分配亦必須重視調整

以配合國際化及現代化的步伐與要求，以便在合法的資本主義的市場中大展拳腳，從而掌握好它在副社會體系的地位、生存空間，以及步向合法社會體系發展的籌碼。黑手黨、山口組、竹聯幫及14K的發展提供了適應性變遷的例子。

本文的結論是，由於對有組織的偏差的實徵性研究已累積了可觀的資料，這應是社會學者對這另一社會體系進行理論化或社會學化的時機了，換言之，有組織的偏差，其行為或結合體，亦應從邊際學科走入社會學的領域了。

關鍵字：偏差結合體、紐帶型式、權力結構、社會變遷、國際化、三合會、黑手黨、暴力團

